Objective: To examine if clustering of root causes of sentinel events (SEs) can contribute to organisational improvement of healthcare and patient safety by providing insight into organisational risk factors, patterns and trends. Design: Retrospective, cross-sectional review of SEs from a hospital database reported to the Board of directors in 2016. Setting: A regional teaching hospital in the Netherlands. Intervention(s): Clustering of characteristics and variables of SEs to establish vulnerabilities and patterns of failure factors of the organisation. Main Outcome Measure(s): Characteristics and contributory causes of failure of SEs identified via root cause analysis (RCA). Outcomes reported using descriptive statistics. Results: A total of 21 events were included involving 21 patients. Mean age was 56.7 years (SD 24.4), 71.4% were above 50 years of age. In 81.8%, the care was multi-disciplinary and in 76.2% the event resulted in permanent harm or injury. Of the 132 identified contributory root causes, most were related to human factors (53.8%) and organisational factors (40.2%). Technical and patient-related factors were identified in 3.0%. Organisational improvement strategies focused on the care of elderly patients, patients subjected to multi-disciplinary care and on improving knowledge, protocols and coordination of care. Conclusion: Clustering variables of SEs and contributory factors of failure through RCA helps to delineate a hospital-specific profile by providing a detailed insight into risk factors, patterns and trends in an organisation and to determine the best strategies for improvement by drawing lessons across events.
Introduction
Safety and quality is essential for the delivery of optimal healthcare and remains an important issue. The first step to improve safety is to gain insight into the frequency and seriousness of unsafe situations. A systematic review of the literature conducted in 2018 showed that the incidence of in-hospital adverse events was 9.2% and in 7.4% the event was lethal. Almost half of the reported events were considered preventable [1] .
The burden of adverse events on healthcare resources is significant; it is estimated to amount to 1% of the national healthcare budget [2] . Most attention has been directed at hospitals because of the high-risk procedures and hazardous environment [3] . Several reports have highlighted the need for healthcare organisations to monitor and learn from adverse events [4] . The importance of developing effective systems for learning from failure is still growing [5] . An incident reporting system is a tool that has the potential of providing insight into the occurrence of events, making it possible to identify causes and risk factors [6] . Incident reporting and analysis originated in safety-critical industries and in the transport sector [6] .
Identifying and learning from events helps in continuously making the healthcare system safer [6, 7] . To protect and improve public healthcare, the safety and quality of the Dutch healthcare system is monitored by the Dutch Health and Youth Care Inspectorate (IGJ). The IGJ oversees and regulates all Dutch healthcare providers and professionals. It is mandatory for all Dutch healthcare organisations to report a sentinel event (SE), i.e. an unintended and unexpected event related to the quality of care which caused death or serious harm to a patient. This is an important tool contributing to the improvement of quality and safety [8] .
Appropriate response in case of an SE includes conducting a timely and reliable root cause analysis (RCA), followed by developing improvements, implementing these improvements and finally monitoring the effectiveness of the improvements [9] . RCA has been widely adopted as a method to help clinicians and healthcare organisations to analyse and learn from SEs by systematically investigating events, correcting causes and preventing reoccurrence [10, 11] . As RCA of an SE is based on an in-depth analysis of a single event, it often provides tools to improve care in specific situations.
Although RCA is a powerful tool for developing and maintaining awareness of risks, it remains challenging to effectively detect organisational and management factors contributing to SEs within an organisation [12, 13] . Organisations tend to approach each RCA independently, rather than drawing lessons across investigations [12] . It has been hypothesised that clustering of data of various SEs can help in capturing organisational risk factors and defects across events, thus supporting system improvement in organisations [3] .
The objective of this study was to examine if clustering of root causes of SEs can contribute to improvement of healthcare and patient safety by identifying vulnerabilities and patterns of failure factors of an organisation.
Methods

Study design and setting
This study was conducted in the Zaans Medical Center (ZMC), a regional teaching hospital in the Netherlands with 293 beds, 1300 employees, 120 medical specialists and 27.000 admissions every year. Employees of the ZMC are expected to report suspected SEs to the Board of directors by means of a reporting system. The Board members determine, after consulting experts, whether the incident should be classified as an SE and should be reported to the inspectorate.
In the current study, we retrospectively analysed all suspected SEs reported to the board of directors in 2016. The reason for conducting an extensive analysis focusing on identified root causes was that the number of SEs reported in 2016 was significantly higher than in previous years. According to the policy of the ZMC, this study met the criteria for organisational improvement of patient and healthcare safety and was exempt from ethics review, as all data were anonymized and de-identified.
All reported SEs were analysed by means of the Systematic Incident Reconstruction and Evaluation (SIRE) method, a Dutch prototype RCA method. SIRE, adapted from a method developed by the National Center for Patient Safety of the Department of Veterans Affairs, was developed to examine and analyse adverse events [14] . The process focuses primarily on systems and not on individuals [10] . Basic and contributing factors are discovered in a process similar to the diagnosis of a disease, i.e. by answering the following questions: What happened? Why did it happen? How can we prevent it happening again? How will we know if the actions we took made a difference? This method also includes the perspectives of the patient and the patient's family.
RCAs are performed in the ZMC by an experienced multidisciplinary team consisting of clinicians, nurses, staff members and a coordinator. If necessary, internal or external experts are consulted as well. The team does not include persons who were involved in the incident under investigation. RCAs and reports are considered to be confidential and are treated accordingly, but improvement measures are broadly disseminated within the organisation.
The following procedure was conducted in the ZMC. The first step in the RCA process is to identify and reveal underlying dominant risk and failure factors, so-called root causes. Root causes are used to provide a more realistic view of how systems work, as well as to create effective and lasting solutions [15] [16] [17] . In the second step, the identified root causes are classified by linking them to one of the five main categories and subcategories of the medical version of the Eindhoven Classification Model (ECM) of system failure, Table 1 [17] .
The ECM coding system has been tested and validated in medical settings [18] . In this model, latent failures are classified first to increase the likelihood of discovering all causes underlying the event. The main categories of the ECM system are latent factors (technical and organisational), active failures (human), patient-related factors and unclassifiable factors, Table 1 [19, 20] . The RCA results in a report with an action plan that identifies causes and intended strategies for improvement to reduce the risk of similar events occurring in the future. The plan addresses responsibilities for implementation and strategies for measuring the effectiveness of the actions.
Data collection
The SEs reported in 2016 were obtained from the hospital database. In this database, all reported events are recorded anonymously. Events were included if they were classified as an SE and if the ZMC was primarily involved. For each recruited SE report, the following variables were extracted and analysed: baseline characteristics (patient age, gender), event characteristics (day and time of the incident, number and type of healthcare professionals involved, incident category, degree of harm, number of healthcare organisations involved and incident location), root causes as identified through RCA, and improvement measures that were developed and implemented. Types and locations of the events were categorised according to the Harvard Medical Practice Study classification [21] .
Statistical analysis
Data of the identified and recruited SEs were first summarised using descriptive statistics and frequency tables. We used the identified RCAs to extrapolate the detected root causes. Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS (version 20). The appropriate analyses were performed, including mean, median, percentages and standard deviation (SD).
Results
The total number of suspected SEs reported to the Board of Directors in 2016 was 28. After consultation of experts, 23 events were considered to be SEs. The 23 SEs were reported to the IGJ and subsequently evaluated by a multi-disciplinary team. For the current analysis, two of these events were excluded. One event was excluded because according to the Dutch Health Care inspectorate (IGJ) it was not an SE but a complication of a surgical procedure. One other event was excluded because it occurred in another healthcare organisation and was not related to the procedures of or the care provided by the ZMC. As a result, 21 SEs were included in the current analysis. 
Characteristics of the reported sentinel events
The 21 included SEs involved a total of 21 patients. The characteristics of the patients and of the events are shown in Table 2 . In 14 cases (66.7%) the patient was female. The mean age was 56.7 years (SD 24.4), and in 71.4% the patient was above 50 years of age. In seven cases (33.3%), at least one other healthcare organisation was involved.
The types and locations of the events are shown in Table 2 . Seven events (33.3%) were operation-related, five (23.8%) were related to the diagnostic procedure and three (14.3%) were medication-related. Almost half of the events occurred on the ward (42.8%) and 28.6% occurred in the operating theatre. In 18 of the 21 events (81.8%), at least two medical specialists or departments were involved. In 16 cases (76.2%), the event resulted in permanent harm or injury and in 6 cases (28.6%), the patient died.
Involvement of healthcare professionals
A total of 133 healthcare professionals were involved in the 21 events. The number of professionals involved in an event ranged from 3 to 11, with a mean of 6.3 (SD 2.5). Medical specialists were predominantly related to the SE in 43.6% of the cases, followed by nurses in 17.3% and resident physicians in 12.8%. The number of medical specialists related to the treatment at the time of the event ranged from 1 to 5, with a mean of 3 ( Table 2 ).
Causes of sentinel events
Analysis of the 21 SEs resulted in the identification of 132 contributory root causes, ranging between 3 and 15 in a single event, with a mean of 6.3 (SD 3.8). When the root causes were classified into the five main categories according to the ECM taxonomy, 71 (53.8%) were human, 53 (40.2%) organisational, 4 (3.0%) technical and 4 (3.0%) patient-related. None of the root causes was unclassifiable.
Technical, human and organisational root causes were subdivided into one or more specific subcategories (Table 1) . Human factors were the most frequently identified root causes (n = 71). More than half of the human factors (53.5%) were related to knowledgebased behaviour (HKK), followed by verification (HRV) in 19.7% (Fig. 1) . Of the organisational factors (n = 53), 66.0% were related to protocols and procedures (OP) followed by management priorities (OM) in 13.2%. In the category technical factors (n = 4), three were related to design (TD) and one to material defects (TM). External and patient-related factors were hardly identified, and hence an in-depth analysis was not possible.
Improvement strategies
Prevention strategies in case of a single event tend to focus on that event, aiming to improve local work condition and processes, improvement strategies on the organisational level were rarely proposed.
Based on the identified root causes in our analysis, various interventions were carried out. A hospital-based protocol was designed in collaboration with medical specialists, nurses and management, describing the important aspects of patient care, including the processes of admission, diagnosis, treatment and discharge. Furthermore, the protocol draws attention to the special requirements necessary for treating elderly and complex patients requiring multi-disciplinary care.
The protocol describing the different roles of a medical specialist was updated, describing and clarifying the cooperation between departments and healthcare workers and the coordination of multidisciplinary care and formalising the role of the medical specialist who must guide and coordinate the care provided for the patient. To tackle human and organisational factors, which occurred most frequently, an organisation-wide programme has been constructed to improve the knowledge, quality and availability of protocols and procedures and to enhance safety behaviour by means of training programmes. Regular audits were planned to examine the safety behaviour of departments. 
Discussion
General findings and interpretation
Healthcare should be available to people when necessary and should be effective and safe. Incident reporting and analysis is widely recognised as an important tool for improving reliability and patient safety in the care delivery process [23] . An increase in safety can only be achieved if interventions tackle the right underlying causes. This study reports on accumulated data of SEs and examined if clustering of root causes of SEs, i.e. events with significant harm to patients, helps in identifying the weaknesses of an organisation. In 21 included SEs, 132 root causes were identified, illustrating the multi-factorial nature of events. Events predominantly occurred on wards and the operation theatre and involved elderly patients and patients receiving multi-disciplinary care. The events had permanent consequences in 76.2% of the cases. Root causes were predominantly related to human factors (knowledge-based behaviour, verification and coordination) and organisational factors (protocols and procedures, management priorities and transfer of knowledge).
On the basis of our analysis, several improvement strategies were carried out on both local and organisational level. A hospital-based protocol was designed regarding the care of patients, especially the elderly and patients receiving multi-disciplinary care. An organisational programme was developed to improve knowledge and safety behaviour by training healthcare professionals. The coordinating role of medical specialists was formalised to improve the provided multidisciplinary care. The quality and availability of protocols and process descriptions were evaluated and improved. Proposed prevention strategies tackle both local, organisational and management factors. However, a clear framework is lacking to identify which types of incidents can be prevented with which type of interventions [12] .
Clustering of RCAs seems valuable for identifying risk factors, undesirable patterns and trends as it focusses on systems and processes on an organisational level; a hospital-specific profile can be delineated. As hospitals are complex organisations, practically every step in the precarious process can have a negative effect on patient safety and healthcare safety. A safety management approach is crucial to identify factors and preconditions affecting the organisation [24, 25] . Prevention strategies of a single event tend to focus on the surroundings and circumstances of that event, aiming to improve local work procedures and processes, making it difficult to detect organisational vulnerabilities and patterns of failure and subsequently recommend improvement on that level [22] . Improvements strategies on the organisational level were rarely proposed.
Aggregate analysis of SEs is a systematic process; priorities for improvement are based on multiple cases, rather than just one case. The importance of this approach is that it recognises that organisations have inherent weaknesses and that failures will manifest in local working conditions; focusing on individual responsibility is likely to be ineffective [11] . A systemic, rather than the individual view is likely to support continuous improvement and promote future reporting of failures in healthcare [13] .
Comparison with previous studies
After extensively reviewing the literature, we did not encounter other studies reporting on data of SEs of a single organisation. Nevertheless, the identified root causes in our study, predominantly human and organisational, are in accordance with previous studies [26] [27] [28] . The identified factors in the study of Smits et al. [26] were predominantly labelled as organisational and human, considered preventable in 66%-93% of the cases and related to permanent disability in 13-20%. Failures related to the quality and availability of protocols were frequently related to permanent disability. The root causes of failure of 522 unintended events at ten emergency departments in the Netherlands were predominantly human and organisational [25] . In 25%, the event was related to the cooperation between departments and healthcare workers within an organisation. Nuckols et al. [28] reported the characteristics of 2246 identified incidents in the USA. The events occurred primarily in floor units (50%) and were related to medication, operations and procedures. Similar to the improvement strategies in our study, most reported strategies were quality assurance/peer review, training, improvement of organisational procedures, improvement of sources of information and evaluation [1, 22, 27] . Prevention strategies at the organisational level were least often considered. Although, it seems worthwhile to direct interventions on organisational causes because organisational causes are nearly always believed to be preventable [26] .
Strengths and limitations
Our study has various advantages. We used an existing reporting system for identifying events, and 96% of the identified SEs were included. RCA was performed directly with the assessment of the SEs; the data were therefore original and accurate, not based on summaries of compiled information. Root causes were classified via ECM, which is a well-established and evidence-based framework.
A limitation of the current study is that we were unaware of the intentions and attitudes of professionals regarding reporting of events and were not able to correct for possible underreporting. All reporting systems rely on professionals submitting events occurring within routine work situations, but many events will go unreported, with doctors being less likely than nurses to report events [13, 29] . Besides, although an SE is clearly defined, there is still uncertainty whether events should be classified as SEs. Unintended events that occur more frequently are believed to share the same underlying failure factors [30, 31] . As we were not able to accurately identify unintended incidents, we did not include them in our analysis.
In the current analysis, all identified root causes were considered equal, while in clinical practice this is not the case. Contributory factors can vary according to the level of proximity to the event [11] . Caution must be exercised, as only 21 SEs were included. To produce reliable results, it has been suggested to include at least 50 events, preferably across organisations [27] . The advantage of the current method is that a hospital-specific profile can be delineated to determine where best to focus strategies for improvement. The reliability and generalisability of this approach can be improved by applying this method in several organisations on a regular basis.
Implications for practice and future research
Clustering data of events helps to target interventions and to increase organisational learning; it is a process of creating and applying valid knowledge to improve patient safety of an organisation. Aggregation of RCA can help to build organisational and technical defences.
Clear information and action feedback are fundamental in supporting continuous improvement in the healthcare processes [25] . Information concerning root causes of failures and corrective actions should be widely disseminated across organisations at the regional and the national level to increase awareness, prevent recurrence and improve safety. Effective safety feedback systems represent an ongoing cyclical process of reporting, evaluation and corrective actions [25] . Formulating corrective actions is more difficult than finding failure causes [23] . How organisations should implement corrective actions may vary in practice and is an important topic for further research.
We want to encourage others to apply this framework to help improve the healthcare system. The advantage is that organisations can learn from each other, especially from implemented improvements. To be able to achieve this, it is imperative to use the same taxonomy of failure factors in order to enable regional, national and international comparisons. The future lies in targeted incident reporting, robust analysis with the engagement of healthcare professionals and evaluation of the effectiveness of improvements. Incident reporting must be coupled with visible, sustainable improvements and, most importantly, dissemination of the acquired knowledge.
Conclusion
Incident reporting and analysis is crucial for improving healthcare safety. RCA has been adopted as a method to analyse and identify root causes of failure. The current study describes a strategic tool in safety management: by aggregating data of SEs, a framework of contributing root causes of failure is produced. A hospital-specific profile can be delineated to provide detailed insight into organisational patterns and risk factors, but most importantly to determine where best to focus organisational and management changes to improve patient safety and healthcare safety in the entire organisation, by drawing lessons across events.
